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Abstract
Why do poor farmers not take up microcredit loans, even when the terms 
are designed to be pro-poor? Fieldwork in a village in China’s Guizhou 
province revealed a puzzle: although the county government had designed a 
loan program that was intended to be unusually pro-poor, only three of the 
349 eligible households had successfully applied. This article analyzes three 
potential hypotheses: farmer failure (risk aversion or financial illiteracy), 
market failure (lack of viable or stable market opportunities), and institutional 
failure (structural or institutional barriers precluding taking up loans). Based 
on evidence from intensive interviews, we reject the first hypothesis, and 
conclude that the persistence of structural and institutional barriers can 
preclude the poor from taking up loans. However, even if these barriers 
are overcome, we suggest that microcredit loans should be integrated into 
a larger development policy designed to stimulate the market and market 
opportunities in which the poor can participate.
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As part of an effort to apply China’s President Xi Jinping’s “precision pov-
erty reduction” policy, the government of Lüdi county in Guizhou created an 
unusually ambitious microcredit program.1 Based on the idea that financial 
exclusion remains a barrier to poverty reduction, local officials targeted 
Penggan, a remote village deep in the mountains. Their dedication was 
remarkable: officials at the township and county levels reached out individu-
ally to the 349 households living under the poverty line (more than a quarter 
of the township’s households), encouraging them to apply for a microcredit 
loan that could range from RMB 30,000 (approximately USD 4,387) to RMB 
100,000 (USD 14,623). Understanding the high failure rate for microcredit 
programs that do not consider either the agricultural production cycle or the 
repayment challenges faced by most subsistence farmers, the government’s 
terms were especially pro-poor: no interest accrued, and no payment was 
required for the first three years. However, despite these farmer-friendly 
terms designed to accommodate the special needs of the poor and even with 
door-to-door efforts to promote the loan, the loan reached only three of the 
eligible households. Why was the microcredit program not utilized by greater 
numbers of local farmers in this area?
This puzzle reflects a broader question in the microcredit literature regard-
ing the ways in which microcredit programs can best be structured and imple-
mented to reduce poverty in poor areas. Many argue that microcredit programs 
can be effective at reducing poverty in ways that do not increase dependence 
on aid or welfare programs. By providing seed money at lower-than-market-
rate interest to start small-scale businesses or commercial agricultural activi-
ties, microcredit loans can be serviced by the profits generated by such 
economic activities. Repayment in turn allows money to be offered to greater 
numbers of low-income recipients, rendering the program self-sustainable 
and even profitable—at least according to microfinance proponents (e.g., 
Hossain, 1988; Woodworth, 2000; Banerjee, 2013). The idea caught fire, 
finding early supporters of all ideological stripes: the left were encouraged by 
the asset focus of microcredit, and for its empowerment of the poor, espe-
cially women. Microfinance’s pro-market orientation and focus on self-help 
appealed to the right.
Despite this support, even before Muhammad Yunus was graced with the 
Nobel Prize in 2006, scholars were hotly debating the extent to which micro-
credit programs benefit the poor (see Banerjee, 2013). Although proponents 
underscore microcredit’s potential to reduce poverty, even early supporters 
typically emphasize that the effectiveness of microcredit is both limited (e.g., 
unhelpful to the poorest of the poor) and conditional (e.g., Morduch, 1999: 
1610). Success, these proponents maintain, depends on such factors as the 
availability of subsidies and regulations (Ghosh, 2013: 1215–18), the effective 
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application of mobile technology (Lopez and Winkler, 2018: 1566–67), dele-
gation of loan decisions to local agents (Maitra et al., 2017), and the ideology 
of the local government (Gul et al., 2017). Detractors have criticized micro-
credit initiatives broadly for perpetuating fundamentally flawed systems of 
neoliberalism (e.g., Bateman and Chang, 2012), ignoring cultural differences 
(Yang, 1994), perpetuating unequal power relations (Loubere, 2016: 12–17), 
and shifting blame for poverty from policy makers to farmers themselves (Ali, 
2014). Other critics argue more narrowly that microcredit programs do not 
spark development or reduce poverty (e.g., Mader, 2016). For instance, loans 
often fail to reach the poorest of the poor (e.g., Hsu, 2014: 254–56), and are 
often directed to wealthier recipients who are believed to be more capable of 
paying off the loans (Ghosh, 2013: 1207). Poor recipients will sometimes 
divert microcredit loans to meet basic needs rather than apply the funds to 
revenue-generating investments (e.g., Banerjee, 2015). When poor recipients 
cannot service their debt, some accept additional microcredit loans, creating 
and perpetuating, rather than addressing, vicious cycles of debt (e.g., Karlan 
and Zinman, 2011; Zeller and Meyer, 2002). Even when poor recipients estab-
lish businesses, critics contend that such businesses are often unsustainable or 
actually worsen farmers’ situations (Bateman, 2015). Even when these busi-
nesses succeed, they often fail to increase consumption, a fundamental indica-
tor of poverty reduction (e.g., Banerjee, 2013: 504). Other critics charge that 
due to concerns of sustainability or profitability, most microcredit programs 
are structured to make repayment difficult or impossible for poor farmers. 
This is said to undermine the ability of microcredit to reduce poverty through 
a self-sustaining program, especially in rural contexts where income is tied to 
seasonal or even annual cycles that preclude monthly repayment schedules 
(e.g., Park and Ren, 2001: 52–53; Unger, 2002: 25).
Despite this diversity of arguments, the debate has largely centered on 
microcredit programs’ effectiveness after loans have been distributed. 
Comparatively less attention has focused on factors that deter individual 
farmers from applying for loans, or ultimately failing to receive them. Indeed, 
previous research trying to understand the low take-up rate has conducted 
statistical analysis (for a review, see Hamada, 2010). But these overly aggre-
gated studies have been inconclusive and point in different directions. What 
is more, aggregated statistical analysis can sometimes conceal the conditions 
under which a program could be effective (e.g., Li, Gan, and Hu, 2011b).
Thus, an effort to understand the puzzling outcome in Penggan’s case con-
tributes to these understudied aspects of the debate. Local officials designed 
the program proactively to avoid the fundamental problems and concerns that 
microcredit’s critics raise. Detractors often dismiss microcredit for being lit-
tle more than ordinary microloans provided by private enterprises at a high 
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interest rate, with repayment encouraged through social pressure. By con-
trast, in Penggan, the local government attached substantial subsidies and 
waved interest payments. The microcredit program here targeted individual 
households, not a group of villagers or neighbors from the same area, mean-
ing there would be none of the social pressure that exists in a group-lending 
structure. The government viewed the program not as an alternative to wel-
fare, but as a supplement. Far from shifting pressure away from poverty 
reduction, as discussed above, the program resulted from the intense pressure 
from Beijing to eliminate poverty entirely.
Further deepening the puzzle, rural China is in many ways ripe for using 
microcredit to reduce poverty. Although the role of agriculture has declined 
over time, it remains strong, with functional distribution systems and markets 
and some cash crops and livestock. As for Lüdi county, its transportation 
infrastructure has rapidly been improved, and now includes higher quality 
paved roads that traverse the mountains and link townships in the area to the 
county seat. Self-sufficiency in agriculture has long been a central national 
security priority. Moreover, China’s credit market has been gradually open-
ing up to nongovernmental-affiliated organizations, allowing the entry of pri-
vate microcredit firms into the market. The Hu Jintao administration focused 
on rural development (Looney, 2015: 910–12), while the Xi Jinping govern-
ment in 2015 prioritized the complete elimination of rural poverty in a very 
short time and held local government officials accountable for success 
(Xinhua News Agency, 2017).
Moreover, microcredit specifically enjoys substantial political support. 
Both the central government and international organizations working in 
China have applied microcredit to reduce both rural and urban poverty (for 
background, see Revindo and Gan, 2017; Loubere and Shen, 2018). As early 
as 1993, local governments had experimented with different models and 
approaches to providing microcredit, with varying degrees of success 
(Sugeno and Yahata, 2016; World Bank Group, 2018). The central govern-
ment doubled-down on the use of microcredit to reduce poverty by establish-
ing the Employment Microcredit Program in 2002. Originally designed to 
target urban poverty, the program has since 2006 been extended to rural areas 
(Loubere and Shen, 2018). Subsequently, China’s central government has 
issued a number of policies, directives, and suggestions regarding the use of 
microcredit for poverty reduction. For instance, the program established in 
Penggan was inspired by a central initiative promulgated by the State Council 
Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development in December 
2014. The initiative, “Guidance on Innovation and Development of Poverty 
Alleviation Microfinance,” in many ways mirrors the Lüdi county govern-
ment’s program; indeed, local officials cited these and other directives in 
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modestly deflecting credit for the innovative and proactive portions of their 
microcredit program. The leading group’s document does underscore the 
goal of using microcredit to reduce poverty, calling for providing credit to 
poor households, specifying “three-year loans of up to RMB 50,000 for poor 
households that meet the conditions for the loan,” while stressing that local 
governments may arrange subsidies for interest payments. To support the 
broad goal of providing more access to credit in rural areas, the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2014 committed to expanding 
its network of financial services to all villages within three to five years 
(World Bank Group, 2018: 26, 39–40).
However, following the leading group’s call to local governments to inno-
vate based on local conditions, Lüdi county government officials went well 
beyond the regulations by establishing subsidies that altogether eliminated 
payments for the first three years and by extending the loan ceiling to RMB 
100,000. While the 2014 document implores local government officials to 
prioritize microcredit as part of their anti-poverty policies, it does not pre-
scribe the kind of door-to-door efforts that local government officials have 
used to encourage farmers to apply for loans. Due to the Lüdi government’s 
genuine efforts to promote the program and make it especially pro-poor, it is 
especially puzzling that few loans were disbursed.
Our research focuses on the township-turned-village, Penggan. Its popula-
tion mainly survives on agricultural production, especially on subsistence crops 
such as corn and rapeseed; commercial crops, including sorghum and tobacco; 
and animal husbandry—chickens, pigs, and cows. It is part of Qianwan town-
ship, which is a minority township and one of the poorest in Guizhou, which 
itself is one of China’s poorest provinces. Even with the recently completed 
paved road that traverses the mountain separating the village and the township 
seat, getting to the village still requires a one-hour journey. The vast majority of 
residents in the village are subsistence farmers, with several shopkeepers and 
restaurateurs running businesses in the few-block urban area within the larger 
village. The area had recently seen the closure of an employment mainstay, as 
two coal mines succumbed to tumbling coal prices, putting nearly a thousand 
workers from Penggan and surrounding villages out of work. When open, the 
mines allowed most households with at least one able-bodied member to count 
on a stable cash income during the farming off-season. Although rural families 
in the village receive central rural subsidies and welfare programs that have 
been promulgated over the past decade (e.g., Lin and Wong, 2012: 28–33, 44–
45), the area has remained poor and underdeveloped. Like most other poor 
villages in contemporary China, Penggan experiences little hunger or home-
lessness. Yet most of the residents have little spending money, and they struggle 
to eke out a living on subsistence farming.
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Despite facing problems shared by most other poor villages in China, 
Penggan is in many ways an ideal area for this study. Penggan is a relatively 
developed village in the area. Because it was previously a township, the area 
is somewhat more urbanized than most typical, remote villages. Many raw 
materials for traditional Chinese medicine, including du zhong and tianma, 
grow wild, scattered around the village and its surrounding area. Yet the scale 
of growth and remoteness of the village preclude the widespread cultivation 
of the raw materials for traditional Chinese medicine, although the local doc-
tor picks these and other herbs fresh when treating patients who come from 
afar. Its sorghum farmers have managed to sell their produce to Guizhou’s 
well-known distilleries in Maotai, at least until Xi’s anti-corruption drive 
sharply crimped demand for elite brands of rice wine. Finally, Penggan is 
located in a province that has historically developed market opportunities 
that rural residents with little formal education and experience can take up 
(Donaldson, 2011). Thus, the area is in many ways ideal for a successful 
microcredit program—yet it failed, not after loans were distributed, but at 
earlier links in the causal chain that theoretically connects microcredit pro-
grams with poverty reduction. For this reason, unraveling this puzzle has 
direct implications for the future of effective financial inclusion strategies.
Based on the burgeoning literature on microcredit, we identify seven 
stages of microcredit concerned with, first, obtaining it, and subsequently 
investing and repaying it. These segments represent links in a causal chain; 
each link is required if microcredit is to succeed (see Figure 1). Various fac-
tors can encourage or discourage the utilization of microcredit. These seven 
stages allow us to trace more clearly the causal mechanisms that drive the 
process of successfully implementing microcredit programs. Our puzzle 
Figure 1. Poverty alleviation cycle.
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directs us to focus on the first four segments of the chain. In which segment 
did the Lüdi county government’s microcredit program go awry?
The academic literature reveals three primary schools of thought that per-
tain to this puzzle, each representing a cluster of hypotheses that could poten-
tially explain the puzzling low take-up rate in Penggan. First, the “farmer 
failure” school argues that farmers are reluctant to borrow because they are 
either too ignorant (financial illiteracy) or too stubborn (risk aversion) to take 
up credit. This widely held opinion holds that, even when a microcredit pro-
gram’s designers focus on helping the poor (segment 3), a lack of formal 
education and a cultural penchant against risk-taking continue to inhibit 
farmers from borrowing (segment 4) (e.g., Evans et al., 1999: 420–21, 427–
28; Develtere and Huybrechts, 2005: 174; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Honohan, 2009: 133; Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010). Further, farmers 
often face diminished access to formal credit as they may not have the basic 
literacy levels needed to understand complex financial concepts, let alone the 
tools to apply for credit (Mohamed, 2003: 22–24). In the Chinese context, in 
explaining the lack of demand for formal microcredit loans, many research-
ers assume, though rarely test, a general lack of financial literacy among rural 
farmers, (e.g., Li, Gan, and Hu, 2011a: 237, 243–45; Tang, Guan, and Jin, 
2010: 12, 16).
•• Hypothesis 1 (farmer failure): Farmers’ financial illiteracy causes 
them to not apply for microcredit loans.
•• Hypothesis 2 (farmer failure): Farmers’ risk aversion causes them to 
not apply for microcredit loans.
A second line of thought, held by the “market failure” camp, rejects the 
idea that farmers are inherently risk averse or ignorant. Instead, farmers’ 
reluctance to accept loans is often based on their genuine belief that their 
region lacks reasonable market opportunities (segment 5). In an early study, 
Robert A. Collins (1985) suggested that business risk—risk that is exogenous 
to the firm—can undermine farmers’ willingness to access debt. He further 
argued that government policies designed to reduce such risks will encourage 
farmers to increase their financial leverage (Collins, 1985: 627, 629). 
However, Collins provided no empirical evidence to support his model. 
Though many have continued to refine Collins’s model mathematically, few 
studies have actually explicitly studied risk aversion and business risk empir-
ically. Colum Turvey and Kong Rong’s (2009) research in China represents 
one such exception. Surveying 400 farm households, they conclude that 
farmers’ debt choices are shaped more by their attempts to balance risks on 
yield, price, and revenue, than by risk aversion, which they measure by 
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attitudes toward changing production choices, adopting new technology, and 
applying new management practices (Turvey and Kong, 2009: 156, 165, 
169). In addition to this direct research, indirect evidence also suggests that 
farmers are deterred from borrowing less by irrational risk aversion than by 
high levels of business risk. For instance, when Karlan and Zinman (2011) 
randomly assigned microcredit borrowers to business training, poor Filipinos 
tended not to invest, suggesting that the training helped potential borrowers 
to discern that many potential opportunities might not represent shrewd 
investments. However, beyond this and a handful of other empirical studies, 
most scholars have not empirically tested the idea that turning down loans 
can be reasonable, instead concluding that such behavior represents irrational 
risk aversion.
In addition to concerns related to business risk, geographic considerations 
can distort markets. For instance, sheer physical distance from larger-scale 
economic activity causes weak integration into the national economy, reduc-
ing remote households’ access to and demand for credit (Okurut, 2006: 5; 
Kabeer, 2006: 65). Scholars argue that low levels of formal lending are linked 
to farmers’ proximity to formal banking institutions (Tang, Guan, and Jin, 
2010: 11, 13–14). In addition, socioeconomic networks of recommendation 
and information, which are purported to play a crucial role in households’ 
attempts to obtain formal credit, are becoming more disperse (Vaessen, 
2001). Farmers living farther away from village centers and administrative 
offices are likely to face high transaction costs such as the time and expense 
involved in travel. These combine to weaken the social and economic inte-
gration of remote rural households. Thus, while the first camp would antici-
pate farmer failure, the second would look at failings in the market.
•• Hypothesis 3 (market failure): The lack of appropriate, actionable 
market opportunities dissuades poor farmers from applying for loans.
•• Hypothesis 4 (market failure): Geographic isolation from suffi-
ciently large markets dissuades poor farmers from applying for loans.
Finally, a third group of scholars—the “institutional failure” camp—
argues that the structures and institutions that frame and surround microcredit 
programs increase barriers that impede farmers, or certain classes of farmers, 
from accessing credit. Structural factors, such as gender or ethnic discrimina-
tion, or lack of political capital, prevent lending programs (segment 2) from 
reaching the poorest farmers (segment 3). First, many argue that women in a 
variety of contexts face diminished access to formal and informal microcredit 
(e.g., Goetz and Gupta, 1996: 49–53; Mohamed, 2003: 13, 21–22). As Naila 
Kabeer (2006: 65) suggests, the intersection between gender-based bias and 
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economic deprivation creates for women from poor households an additional 
layer of discrimination and social exclusion compared to poor men. In China 
as well, women have systematically lower access to credit, both from infor-
mal and formal sources, including rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) (e.g., 
Cheng and Ahmed, 2014: 312–13). Given the feminization of farming in 
recent decades (e.g., de Brauw et al., 2013), this is an especially vexing prob-
lem. Second, ethnic minorities face higher poverty rates and have less access 
to anti-poverty programs (e.g., Van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001). The 
political exclusion of China’s ethnic minorities begets economic exclusion, 
increasing the difficulty for minority households to access the mechanisms—
including access to credit—required to lift themselves out of poverty (Howell, 
2019). Third, farmers’ lack of political capital—connections to powerful 
decision makers—impedes access to financial resources (Claessens, 2006: 
219, 225; Banerjee and Newman, 1993). Many argue that because lending 
often takes place on the basis of existing relationships and connections (e.g., 
Standifird and Marshall, 2000; Yang, 1994), poor people’s relative lack of 
political clout diminishes their ability to obtain credit from formal lending 
institutions (Li, Gan, and Hu, 2011a: 238). However, others counter that 
political capital is not a significant factor (Tang, Guan, and Jin, 2010: 15).
Some in this institutional failure camp argue that poor households face 
insurmountable institutional barriers. Many have noted the contradiction 
between most microcredit programs’ twin goals of reducing poverty and sus-
tainability. If loan officers are required to show high repayment rates, they 
often reject applications from the very poor, who should be their targets. 
Informal lenders sometimes offer lower interest rates. Financial institutions 
typically demand a bewildering array of documents, business plans, and col-
lateral; these burdens are substantially lower with informal lending institu-
tions (e.g., Tsai, 2002; OECD, 2005; Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic, 2010; Turvey, Kong, and Huo, 2010: 134). In addition to these 
rational factors, sociocultural linkages among relatives and friends offer 
greater credit access from informal channels (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990: 238, 
241; Boucher and Guirkinger, 2007; Tang, Guan, and Jin, 2010: 7, 10–11).
Some microcredit pioneers have taken these structural barriers into 
account when designing their programs. For instance, the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh uses institutional and structural factors to improve the perfor-
mance of its programs. Importantly, Grameen established clear goals of 
empowering women and supporting their economic roles in the household 
and society; it is this that has enabled Grameen to achieve its twin goals 
(Kumar, Hossain, and Gope, 2015: 114–16, 118). By contrast, China’s micro-
credit programs focus on households and offer credit with an emphasis on the 
needs and interests of the men of the household (Unger, 2002). With no clear 
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consistency between the aims and structure of most microcredit institutions, 
the institution may lose sight of its mission—indeed, its raison d’être: pov-
erty reduction. This may be reflected in the rigid structure of the microfi-
nance institutions in rural China, resulting in lower take-up of microcredit. 
Thus, the third camp looks not to farmers or markets to explain low take-up 
rates, but to two types of institutions: social structures such as discrimination 
as well as the way microcredit programs themselves are implemented.
•• Hypothesis 5 (institutional failure): Discrimination based on gender 
and sexist definitions of family cause poor farmers to be rejected when 
they apply for loans.
•• Hypothesis 6 (institutional failure): Poor farmers’ lack of political 
capital causes them to be rejected when they apply for loans.
•• Hypothesis 7 (institutional failure): Poor farmers are rejected for 
technical reasons, such as lack of proper paperwork.
•• Hypothesis 8 (institutional failure): Poor farmers are rejected due to 
the very factors that made them poor, such as poor health or advanced 
age.
These three major camps have implications for understanding the poor 
take-up rate of microfinancing. These camps are not mutually exclusive—it 
is possible that a combination of two or three (or none) of these combined to 
help explain our puzzle. Similarly, it is possible that one or more of these 
camps are partially consistent with any given hypothesis. In any case, adjudi-
cating between these camps is vital, for they each imply different policy pre-
scriptions. Some are more pessimistic about the possibility of the acceptance 
of microcredit loans; others would prescribe minor revisions in policy. 
Importantly, most research in the past has advanced one argument or the 
other, without specifically testing competing explanations. Thus, this article 
is designed to weigh evidence for and against each of these explanations.
Case Selection and Methodology
Ideally, these camps would be tested in a region that has engaged in a new 
credit program with liberal terms but with puzzlingly low take-up rates. If 
possible, this new region should be one that has recently opened to markets 
but has not yet reaped the benefits of these changes. In order to determine 
how microcredit programs help poor rural residents encountering new mar-
kets, the region should still be poor and, until recently, relatively isolated. As 
noted earlier, Penggan village matches these criteria—it is poor though not 
desperately so, and its road to the township had only recently been paved, 
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meaning that it is able to access other markets. Our interviews with both 
township and county officials reveal that they experienced considerable 
pressure to eliminate poverty in the region and had even gone door to door 
to inform poor households in the area about the program and to urge them to 
apply for the loans. With the exception of the ethnic component,2 the prereq-
uisites of all three camps can be found in Penggan, a fair test to understand 
the puzzle.
This study adjudicates the debate over why farmers do not accept micro-
credit loans by applying qualitative methods, particularly by tracing the 
causal mechanisms that link each camp’s hypotheses about failure (Bennett 
and George, 2005). This will help identify key factors that are important not 
only to understanding the puzzling failure of this program but also to under-
standing the mechanisms that actually caused the failure. To this end, we 
interviewed villagers, village leaders, and representatives of county and 
township government agencies. However, our access to certain sections of 
the government was limited. For instance, we were unable to access loan 
officers responsible for executing the scheme. Regarding the interviews out-
side the village, we asked a nonprofit microfinance organization operating in 
China and a for-profit microfinance organization interested in entering the 
market about the difficulties they faced working in the Chinese market, how 
they assess creditworthiness, and the considerations they take into account 
when working with Chinese field partners representing their organization. In 
addition, we conducted face-to-face semi-structured interviews with rural 
residents in all parts of Penggan village. To this end, we interviewed 41 farm-
ers, 15 of whom were women. Of these, nine were also involved in sideline 
activities such as coffin making, selling medicinal herbs, alcohol distilling, 
and selling agricultural products. The interviewees were selected because 
they were on the township’s list of poor households in the area, which we will 
see is imperfect as a reflection of the true poverty situation. To ensure regional 
diversity, interviewers divided up the village’s officially designated neigh-
borhoods. Interview questions revolved around knowledge of and ease of 
access to microcredit, the types of market opportunities (if any) of which the 
interviewees were aware, and if they perceived microcredit generally as 
being potentially beneficial to them. The questions focused on issues related 
to the farmers’ current needs for finance, their assets, and their survival strate-
gies. In addition, we asked them about their perception of and experience 
with the microfinance program being implemented in Penggan, as well as 
any barriers they might have encountered. The interviews, conducted in the 
respondents’ homes, were designed to be open-ended. Even as interviewers 
came prepared with a few guiding questions, respondents were free to guide 
the conversation.
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In this way, we test the causal logic of the three camps’ expectations for 
the failure of Penggan’s rural residents to take up microcredit loans. If the 
farmer failure hypothesis proposed by the first school of thought is correct, 
we would expect to see evidence of financial illiteracy (such as a lack of basic 
knowledge of the process of taking up and using loans) or cultural signs of 
risk avoidance (such as evidence that farmers are unwilling to invest despite 
the potential to earn significant profits). If the market failure hypothesis held 
by the second school of thought is correct, we would expect to see evidence 
of—and farmers’ recognition of—the rapid variation in crop prices of rele-
vant products, the great spatial distance from farmers to credit sources, or the 
lack of viable market opportunities. If the institutional failure camp is correct, 
we would expect to see structural factors—racial or gender discrimination or 
lack of guanxi (connections with powerful people)—being primary barriers, 
or that the institutions are designed in such a way as to preclude systemati-
cally the participation of poor rural residents, such as by setting criteria that 
poor farmers systematically cannot meet. Note that the three camps vary 
from each other in that, while all three expect that farmers would shy away 
from taking up formal loans, in the first case, their reluctance would be due 
to cultural factors, in the second, it would be due to market factors, and in the 
third, it would be due to institutional or structural factors.
Testing the Hypotheses
First School of Thought (Farmer Failure)
Inconsistent with the farmer failure school, our findings revealed that the 
farmers we interviewed (all 41 of them) are equipped with a sufficient 
understanding of relevant aspects of finance. Regarding the knowledge of 
loans, without exception, all farmers we interviewed communicated a clear 
understanding of loan policies, including the duration of the loan, repayment 
terms, and interest rates being charged, and so forth. Additionally, farmers 
were aware of the institutions that they could approach if they chose to bor-
row from a formal microfinance institution. While most farmers did not use 
the specialized terminology and vocabulary often associated with the pro-
cesses in such formal microloans, they universally possessed a layman’s 
knowledge of how those processes work. This provided a clear indication 
that farmers possessed adequate knowledge and understanding of how such 
loans functioned. Moreover, we found little evidence of risk aversion. To be 
sure, many farmers said they declined to apply for loans because of a fear of 
market volatility. Separating this factor from actual risk aversion is difficult; 
a fine line divides investing in often-presumed market opportunities and 
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investing funds, say, in a lottery. While social scientists would label the sec-
ond investor foolish for risking money on such clearly impossible odds, the 
same social scientists may label as risk averse those who decline invest-
ments in markets that might be as foolhardy as purchasing a lottery ticket. 
We deal with this conundrum in two ways. First, when we discussed an 
unwillingness to take up the loans, we looked for signs that farmers had 
examined potential market opportunities. Farmers who had seriously con-
sidered market opportunities and could provide objective reasons why those 
investments were unlikely to succeed we deemed not risk averse. (These 
signs of market failure are discussed in the next section.) Second, we looked 
for other evidence that farmers were willing to take risks in general.
First, the farmers we interviewed displayed a clear understanding and 
knowledge of the markets in which they were operating, and the subsequent 
fluctuations involved in different markets, reflecting knowledge of the eco-
nomic opportunities. They could cite with some specificity the volatile nature 
of prices of crops and meat, with prices of pork and beef noted as being par-
ticularly erratic. As one respondent argued, “The price of pigs changes so 
quickly every few months, so it’s risky to take up a loan to raise them if I 
don’t know what the price will be like. Next year, the price of pigs may be 
very low, and I might not be able to earn enough to be able to pay back the 
loan” (Interviewee 2). He also explained that, given the loan quantum, he 
could only afford a small number of pigs. Even if the price remained stable, 
if he lost one or two, he would be ruined and unable to pay back the loan. 
Another echoed this sentiment, noting that “The loan being offered is too 
small to buy enough livestock to sell and make a good profit after repaying 
the original loan” (Interviewee 22). This provides direct indications that, con-
trary to what many scholars and policy makers believe, farmers in Penggan 
are financially literate and aware of market conditions.
Second, farmers’ lack of risk aversion was also supported by indirect indi-
cations. For instance, we observed the willingness of many farmers to migrate 
in search of better opportunities, a step entailing numerous risks. Initial risks 
on migrating are very high (e.g., Huang, 2009; Zhang, 2015). Still, the will-
ingness of farmers to migrate indicates that they are willing to accept some 
level of risk to improve their economic situation. Furthermore, many farmers 
willingly make major sacrifices to ensure that their children attain higher 
levels of education. This also presents itself as a risky investment since grad-
uating from university guarantees neither a stable job nor a higher income 
(Chan, 2015; Wang, Cooke, and Lin, 2016). Furthermore, a small handful of 
farmers do indeed access loans, but informally through friends and families, 
and invest these in potentially risky opportunities. For instance, Interviewee 
26 reported that she was unable to borrow from formal channels since she 
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was consistently unable to meet existing debt repayments on previous bank 
loans. In order to address her constraints on credit, she turned to informal 
channels such as her relatives. She also shared her preference for borrowing 
from informal channels given the higher bank interest rates she would be 
charged compared to borrowing from relatives. Evidently, many farmers are 
willing to accept risks when they see viable opportunities, a finding that is 
inconsistent with the farmer failure hypothesis.
•• Hypothesis 1 (farmer failure): Farmers’ financial illiteracy causes 
them to not apply for microcredit loans.
Inconsistent: Penggan farmers showed reasonable levels of financial 
literacy.
•• Hypothesis 2 (farmer failure): Farmers’ risk aversion causes them to 
not apply for microcredit loans.
Inconsistent: Penggan farmers generally did not show signs of risk 
aversion, and instead exhibited behavior that indicated they were will-
ing to accept reasonable risks.
Second School of Thought (Market Failure)
In contrast to our conclusions regarding the first school of thought, the evi-
dence collected during interviews was consistent with the second hypothesis: 
the erratic nature of the market in part caused farmers’ unwillingness to take 
up loans. We found that some farmers chose not to accept loans from formal 
credit institutions due to their lack of confidence in their ability to make 
repayments to the institutions. What is more, many villagers cited their own 
or others’ negative experiences in the same market. Farmers speak with great 
familiarity and confidence about the volatility of prices of meat and vegeta-
bles. Moreover, most were aware that their ability to sell many products at a 
high price is constrained. Transportation to distant markets is costly. Unlike 
the practice seen in other villages (for a discussion, see Zhang and Donaldson, 
2008: 37–41), middlemen do not come to Penggan to purchase cash crops 
because there is insufficient quantity to attract them. As noted earlier, some 
farmers believed that the loan quantum would not create sufficient scale for 
them to overcome these obstacles on their own. Others could see opportuni-
ties in cultivating raw materials for traditional Chinese medicine, but the rela-
tive prices of the product and transportation costs prove prohibitive for 
making a living from the product. In this regard, Interviewee 1 shared that
Tan et al. 15
If there was a place we could process du zhong, it would be good since people 
could work there. This area has a lot of du zhong, but because it’s unprocessed, 
it’s too cheap to sell, only one yuan for five hundred grams.
Farmers thus face a chicken-and-egg problem that they cannot autonomously 
solve. Given the constraints, we concluded that the farmers had reasonable 
justifications for not applying for loans.
On the other hand, our evidence was less consistent with the hypothesis 
that spatial distance between rural parts of China and financial institutions 
would be a hindrance to obtaining loans. Distance from socioeconomic net-
works and the associated transaction costs were not observed to affect farm-
ers’ credit demand and credit choice from formal microfinance institutions 
due to the presence of the RCCs even in rural areas. Furthermore, govern-
ment officials regularly make trips even to more remote rural areas to inform 
residents of such a policy and encourage loan take-up. This is evidence for 
the active socioeconomic integration of residents in remote areas, and the 
proximity of rural farmers to formal banking and credit institutions. Distance 
was therefore not observed to be a factor that impeded rural farmers’ access 
to formal microfinance institutions.
•• Hypothesis 3 (market failure): The lack of appropriate, actionable 
market opportunities dissuades poor farmers from applying for loans.
Consistent: Many of Penggan’s farmers cited the lack of market 
opportunities as a reason for not accepting loans.
•• Hypothesis 4 (market failure): Geographic isolation from suffi-
ciently large markets dissuades poor farmers from applying for loans.
Largely inconsistent: While Penggan village is remote, it is con-
nected to the nearest township by a good road. Geographic distance 
has not precluded financial institutions from reaching out to villagers 
and vice versa.
Third School of Thought (Institutional Failure)
The evidence gathered from interviews also proved consistent with several 
aspects of the institutional failure school of thought. In contrast with the 
energy with which local officials promoted the loans, in practice farmers who 
applied for loans were rejected for a number of institutional and structural 
factors. First, gender is an important factor in determining a household’s 
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access to microcredit. Our findings are consistent with studies that point out 
that women in rural China must rely on using their husband’s name to access 
microcredit loans. One typical sentiment was, “Loans must be made in the 
husband’s name” (Interviewee 30). Although loans are targeted at house-
holds, in practice they are officially written to the male head of the house-
hold—clear evidence that the entire process is gendered. Although a married 
man can take up a microcredit loan even if his wife is unwilling, a married 
woman does not have that same opportunity to do so as the husband must be 
the main signatory of loans. This condition was mentioned explicitly by our 
interviewees.
Another major factor that loan evaluators unofficially consider (accord-
ing to multiple interviewees) in assessing applicants is their marital status. 
Ironically, while a woman who is present in the family does not need to sign 
in order for the male head of household to take up a loan, practice has 
shown that if the applicant is unmarried, or if the couple is divorced or 
separated, or has insufficient paperwork to prove a bona fide marriage, their 
loan application will be rejected. One interviewee explained that he was 
unable to take up loans as he was single, while others cited marital status as 
a key factor in determining their ability to take up loans. One interviewee 
explained, “If you’re not married, if you’re divorced or if you’re widowed, 
you can’t get a loan. If you’re married but your husband or wife has run 
away, you also can’t get a loan” (Interviewee 30). Another, Interviewee 5, 
said that “The loan requires you to be married, but since my wife ran away, 
I can’t get a loan.” Importantly, while the wife’s signature is not required, 
she becomes part of the chain of guarantee for loan repayment. As one 
farmer explained, “Your wife becomes your guarantor to ensure that you 
[as the husband] do not run away [from a bad debt]” (Interviewee 2). 
Another respondent explained the logic as, “If you’re not married, it’s easy 
for you to run. If you’re married, it becomes far more difficult to avoid 
repayment” (Interviewee 37). Thus, one’s marital status is a significant fac-
tor in obtaining loans.
Relatedly, many poor families have run afoul of China’s conceptualiza-
tion of the household. For instance, many poor Chinese farmers—whether 
driven by choice, or compelled by social pressure, economic necessity, or 
ensuring sufficient resources in old age—often bear more children than are 
permitted by law. Local governments levy a fine on farmers who do this, 
but the disadvantages continue even after the fine is paid. This microcredit 
program is one such example: families that previously violated China’s 
family planning policies were rejected for loans. In addition, extended fam-
ily members are often considered to be from the same household. Thus, if 
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an applicant’s parents or children were already in debt, other family mem-
bers were often precluded from receiving microcredit loans. This intergen-
erational restriction inhibits the ability of their children to take up loans to 
manage investments of their own.
The evidence also supported the hypothesis that the lack of political 
capital is a barrier to taking up microcredit loans. The farmers we inter-
viewed mentioned political capital (guanxi) as crucial to obtaining loans 
and securing favorable lending terms. One interviewee explained how his 
family “lacks guanxi, which caused my application for a loan to be 
rejected” (Interviewee 22). In their words, those without adequate political 
capital can apply for microcredit loans but are unlikely to get them. The 
family we interviewed who managed to obtain a loan acknowledged the 
role that political capital played in the successful application. As one inter-
viewee explained it, “Guanxi is necessary to obtain loans. In order to get 
better lending terms, you need to have connections with the government” 
(Interview 29).
In addition to these structural barriers, many rural residents seeking to 
apply for microcredit loans were confronted with a number of institutional 
barriers. First, many respondents pointed out a dilemma that is endemic to the 
design of the loan program. Once a household applies for a loan, officers 
must evaluate its ability to repay it. Oftentimes, sheer poverty is seen as a 
barrier to loan repayment; revenues made from any activity, and perhaps even 
the loan itself, might need to be diverted into securing basic needs or manag-
ing unexpected expenses. If a family has already accrued a sizeable debt—a 
common occurrence for many poor families—it can be disqualified from 
receiving assistance under the microcredit scheme.
Furthermore, most poor farmers are impoverished for a specific reason—
lack of sufficient human capital, age, poor health, or other factors have thrust 
them into poverty—that often reduces their ability to pay back loans. First, 
advanced age or serious health issues are both major causes of poverty, as 
well as a reason some poor farmers were rejected or do not apply for loans. 
For instance, one respondent’s savings were drained completely due to high 
costs related to treating his health conditions. This farmer never married, but 
as an older man, he had unofficially adopted and raised an orphaned girl. 
However, she was currently studying in a Lüdi county high school, and thus 
had no income with which to support her father. Yet, his health was failing, 
rendering him unable to obtain employment in outdoor activities, such as 
farming, mining, or construction (Interviewee 3). With no visible way to earn 
money with a loan, his application was rejected. Another shared how his fam-
ily’s insufficient human capital precluded him from working more:
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I can’t go out to work as I have to stay home and look after my elderly relatives. 
My wife ran away and I don’t have anyone else to help me. My elderly relatives 
are also sick so they can’t help look after the children. (Interviewee 5).
Both health and human capital are direct contributors to poverty. Ironically, 
these were also factors that blocked these farmers’ participation in this anti-
poverty program.
Second, many families were deterred for another reason often linked to the 
poor: lack of proper paperwork. Many poor families built their own houses 
but lacked an official deed. An interviewee mentioned his lack of a deed as a 
reason why he did not apply for a loan (Interviewee 22). Others have been 
married for decades, but due to the nature of their marriage or the circum-
stances under which their marriage was performed, they lack official mar-
riage certificates. For instance, one interviewee said, “When I married my 
wife, we were in [a remote area], far from government offices. No one asked 
us to register the marriage” (Interviewee 37). Interviewee 2 faced a similar 
problem: he and his wife never registered his marriage (the official we talked 
to suspected that the farmer had purchased his wife). To compound this prob-
lem, he, like many other poor farmers, also did not carefully retain the papers 
needed to apply for loans (Interviewee 2). Interviewee 4 said that “Without 
your household registration card, you can’t get a loan. If I had mine, I would 
have thought about applying for one and purchasing several cows.” This 
farmer faced an additional barrier: officials failed to find the electronic ver-
sion of the official records (“When they looked for my records, they came up 
empty-handed”). He was not in the system and had no paperwork to over-
come this problem. Producing these forms of paperwork is a requirement for 
successfully applying for microcredit loans.
This reveals a paradox. On the one hand, the county and township govern-
ments aggressively encourage farmers to apply for loans. On the other hand, 
they implement criteria that poor farmers cannot meet. This dilemma stems 
from two contradictory goals: the loans are designed to reduce poverty, but 
loan repayment is also a high priority. These two goals are often in conflict. 
As scholars in this school of thought often emphasize, in order for micro-
credit loans to work as a poverty reduction vehicle, one goal (loan repayment 
and sustainability) or another (poverty reduction) will prevail. In this case, 
even though the loan’s pro-poor structure and design weighed poverty reduc-
tion over repayment, the program’s priorities were reversed when loan deci-
sions were being made. Thus, to make up for the lack of information, the 
lender instead looks at other criteria like health and age to decide credit wor-
thiness and this produces the effect of rejecting farmers who need these loans 
but cannot qualify for them.
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While village-level officials could see the problem, officials we talked to 
at the township or county level failed to grasp the irony. To be sure, officials 
promoting loans are separate from those who evaluate them, and we were 
unable to interview the evaluators. But local government officials did not 
hold these evaluators as being responsible for the failure of the program. 
After all, local officials explained, the evaluator’s job was to understand the 
risks to the program’s sustainability. If a loan applicant represented too high 
a risk, then it was reasonable to reject the application. The implication was 
that it was the farmers’ responsibility to qualify. Instead of thinking of ways 
to address this dilemma, local officials focused on alternative models, such as 
shifting the funds from a loan program from poor households to agribusi-
nesses or wealthy potential investors, with poor households perhaps being 
stakeholders in any resulting enterprise.
•• Hypothesis 5 (institutional failure): Discrimination based on gender 
and sexist definitions of family cause poor farmers to be rejected when 
they apply for loans.
Consistent: Males were assumed to be the head of household and 
were thus privileged in applying for loans. In addition, marital status 
was considered, as was the status of extended family members.
•• Hypothesis 6 (institutional failure): Poor farmers’ lack of political 
capital causes them to be rejected when they apply for loans.
Consistent: Political capital was cited as a reason for loan approval, as 
well as a reason why loans were rejected.
•• Hypothesis 7 (institutional failure): Poor farmers are rejected for 
technical reasons, such as lack of proper paperwork.
Consistent: Penggan farmers lacking house titles, bank statements, or 
marriage documents were rejected for loans.
•• Hypothesis 8 (institutional failure): Poor farmers are rejected due 
to the very factors that made them poor, such as poor health or 
advanced age.
Consistent: Health, age, and even poverty itself were used as criteria 
for rejecting applications for loans.
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Conclusions
Our evidence reveals that although the microcredit programs were based on 
pro-poor principles, most poor farmers in Penggan could not qualify for or 
would not accept loans. If this result was due to barriers that were resistant to 
change—cultural factors, for instance—the potential for microcredit might 
be very much constrained. However, the evidence is inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that the puzzling lack of loan take-up was due to more immutable 
issues such as risk aversion or credit ignorance. We found most poor farmers 
quite willing to take reasonable risks, as evidenced by their willingness to 
migrate, to apply for these microcredit loans, and to engage in other risk-
taking activities. Similarly, ignorance of microfinance did not represent a 
major barrier. The problem is not that farmers do not understand microcredit 
programs and the market—the problem is that they understand so well that 
uncertain markets undermined their confidence in their ability to repay loans 
with even the most liberal terms.
Two major barriers emerged as most important. First, despite the govern-
ment’s attempt to reduce income disparity and expand the financial inclusion 
of the rural poor through state microcredit schemes, most farmers who were 
eligible based on income were unable to participate. We observed that char-
acteristics of rural farmers that caused their impoverishment often became 
the factors that justified rejecting them for a program designed to reduce 
poverty. These barriers have been put in place to increase the likelihood of 
loan repayment, reduce fraud, and increase accountability—an institutional 
Catch-22. Thus, one important lesson is the need for institutional changes 
that reduce discrimination and increase flexibility. However, such changes 
would require fundamentally recasting the rural credit system and designing 
new ways of ensuring responsible use of the loans. Even more difficult than 
wholesale institutional change is reducing major structural social barriers, 
such as discrimination due to gender, marital status, and lack of political capi-
tal. Together, these institutional and structural barriers go a long way toward 
explaining Penggan’s puzzlingly low take-up rate.
As important as these factors may be, even more important is the lack of a 
stable market. Consistent with the predictions of Collins (1985) and Turvey 
and Kong (2009), the farmers were deterred by clear indications of business 
risk, rather than by risk aversion. Thus, even if institutional and structural 
barriers were somehow removed, the lack of stable markets and realistic 
investment opportunities would still deter most potential borrows.
While this article focuses on the barriers to farmers taking up loans, 
shadows of the remaining steps in the poverty alleviation cycle (Figure 1) 
directly affect these decisions. Farmers we interviewed cited reasons related 
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to Step 6 (would investments from the loan pay off and pull me out of pov-
erty?) and especially Step 7 (if the investment does not pay off, how can I 
repay the loan?), affecting Step 4 (whether farmers take up the loan) and 
Step 5 (whether they invest in productive activities). Thus, a second lesson 
is that microcredit programs should be part of larger programs that focus on 
improving market stability, thus providing more opportunities for reason-
able investments.
Collins (1985) suggests that government policies can help to stabilize 
markets, thereby reducing business risks and increasing farmers’ willingness 
to take up microcredit loans. Indeed, the mechanisms and policies through 
which the government and entrepreneurs have stabilized markets in other 
areas of China are legion. These include contracting floor prices with farmers 
or demonstrating stable markets by purchasing all farmers’ produce. In other 
areas, local governments or entrepreneurs have established factories to pro-
cess agricultural goods, thus increasing local demand and adding off-season 
wage employment (see, e.g., Zhang and Donaldson, 2008: 33–35). What is 
more, the region has an unusually rich endowment of indigenous raw materi-
als for traditional Chinese medicine. Would investment in a processing fac-
tory provide the impetus needed for farmers to invest their credit in growing 
these on a larger and more viable scale? Initiatives of this kind could encour-
age the introduction of more attractive and lucrative market opportunities. In 
addition, such partnerships could facilitate the transfer of knowledge and 
skills to the rural poor in order to enable farmers to upscale production. 
However, the sundry development ideas initiated by Qianwan’s local govern-
ment have thus far not focused on such market stabilization measures.
Would addressing these issues and increasing the take-up rate have helped 
reduce poverty in Penggan? It is impossible to determine. As discussed previ-
ously, critics of microfinance in general abound. To be sure, the government 
carefully designed this microcredit program to avoid some of the pitfalls that 
have emerged elsewhere. Yet, there are numerous remaining concerns that 
could prevent microcredit loans from reducing poverty. If the concerns of 
critics are indeed correct, perhaps the low take-up rate represents a blessing 
in disguise.
These concerns aside, the cautious and conditional conclusions of micro-
credit’s advocates suggest that a well-designed microcredit program can be 
a complementary part of a more comprehensive poverty-reduction initiative. 
To be sure, loan repayments must consider crop cycles, and interest rates 
must be low so that additional debt is not overly burdensome. However, 
even this is insufficient. Microcredit programs must also consider the char-
acteristics of poor farmers when it comes to approvals and be prepared to 
sacrifice repayment goals in favor of approving more risky loans. If the goal 
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of anti-poverty policy is to help rural residents take advantage of market 
opportunities in order to increase their own income, could microcredit, if 
structured carefully, help overcome one of the major hurdles—financial 
constraints—that many poorly connected subsistence farmers face? Such an 
approach could also provide an attractive alternative to migration; if farmers 
can stay in their local areas, they can continue to rely on their social capital 
and contribute to rural development.
Such questions are at the core of our puzzle, which focuses not on whether 
loans could be effective, but why so few farmers wound up with loans in the 
first place. The research contributes to the growing understanding that the 
effectiveness of microfinance is at best contingent. Perhaps a microcredit 
program, if part of a larger initiative, would help to relieve poverty by sup-
porting farmers’ own efforts and without relying on additional subsidies and 
other welfare programs. However, when it comes to investing in commercial 
activities, even farmers with sufficient credit often face a dilemma: in order 
to shift into more lucrative activities, they require some form of external 
impetus that promotes opportunities in which poorly educated farmers can 
participate. At the same time, for that impetus to succeed, the area would 
have to have a sufficiently large scale of production. Could this chicken-and-
egg dilemma be resolved by a set of measures and development programs, of 
which carefully designed, pro-poor microcredit programs could be a part? In 
this regard, our research can only be suggestive. What is clear is that the lack 
of such a comprehensive approach doomed this microcredit program, per-
petuating a frustrating pattern of failure.
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Notes
1. All place names (except for the province) have been changed.
2. While Qianwan township has a large number of ethnic minorities, Penggan vil-
lage itself is predominantly Han. Thus, we were unable to test for the role that 
ethnicity plays vis-à-vis microcredit programs, one of the major structural barri-
ers proposed in the literature.
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